The Lecture Begins
The audltonum began ftig. Souse rose from various conversations as umformed officers and clvtians filed III the hall to take empty seats The audience was a broad cross-secnon of nnhm and diplomatic professionals who were proud of then knowledge and operauonal expenences 111 then respecnve fields They were looking forward to heanng the presentauon. then provldmg their own cntlcal analyses of ns content. -4 shghtll nervous naval officer stood at the base of the stage watchmg hs contemporanes settle It % as his thesis that would be presented and cntlqued
The veg back row of the au&tonum was completely vacant. Jf one caught the hght Just nght.
horn ever, and added a bit of unagmatlon, one could perceive a famt tiortlon of the shade\\ s Here the splnts of class~al n-nhtary strategists were gathenng. They. too. were mterested m seemg the presentatlon 'WhatI" exclanned the Frenchman Jonum, "a sailor to discuss malztary strategy? I beheve we may be WaSMg our tune -' John Corbett, Enghsh writer of mantune stratem, started to respond to tis challenge but deferred b hen he sati the ancient Chmese warnor-philosopher Sun-Tzu begm to reply, "The source of knowledge 1s ummportant If it IS a relevant truth We are here to msplre thought, not to Judge the meal before eatmg it Kow silence, the young man begms to speak '" As the na\ al officer walked to the stage and the nose &ed about the lecture hall. Jormtll whispered to the Prussian splnt seated next to hnn, "Carl, I have real problems understandmg that old guy He always takes such an mtiect approach when makmg a pomt *'
The first shde lllummated a wide screen at the center of the stage:
Under the new conditions of warfare, the cumulative effect of partial success, or even mere threat, at a number of points may be greater than the effect of complete success at one p0int.l Lzddell Hart
There is a type of warfare in which the entire pattern is made up of a collection of lesser actions, but these lesser or individual actions are not sequentially interdependent. Each individual one is no more than a single statistic, an isolated plus or minus, in arnvmg at the final result.* The speaker began, "Imagme for a moment a moon-less mght blanketmg a dark, green sea Silently, a thm black penscope emerges above the surface and locks on its prey The operator below confums the target s GPS posmon through the penscope's laser range finder and nods to his LX eapons operator. W~thm moments. a weapon 1s on Its may to demoy the target The penscope 1s razsed agam only to confirm the lilll. then the umt relocates to attack another target w~thm its operatmg area Less than 15 &es a\\ay, m other operatmg areas, sun&r engagements occur as alhed umts stnke mdependently at targets m then assigned posltlons " -'Manq of you recognize this scenario," contmued the lecturer, "as a submarme campagn agamst surface ships .4dn~ral Wyhe cited this form of warfare as an example of cumulate e strategy--a campagn based not on a sequence of engagements leadmg to a prunary ObJecnve, but of mdependent events that have a cumulanve effect on the enemy's capabtity to LX age war." I . "However, I was KOT descnbmg a submanne campagn. Instead, the sea of dark green u as one of vegetanon The umts not submannes, but hght. powerful mfantry umts operatmg throughout a battle region Inserted behmd and around enemy lmes. these future umts are eqmpped with Impressne organic commumcatlon. sensor. and weapon capabtitles They are supported by an overarchg command and control umbrella and allotted an off-shore weapons cache from ships and axcraft Their Job 1s to estabhsh a sensor mesh m their asslgned area', net with the larger command sh-ucture, locate and destroy assigned ObJecuves or targets of opportumty. and prevent the enemy's use of their region for manurer or resupply. Thelrs 1s not to 'occupy' terntory, only to prevent the enemy's use of It. As the campagn progresses, and u hen the opportumty anses, these urnts could duect their efforts to massrng~f?res agamst a pn otal target as directed by a central coordmatmg commander *'
A second shde flashes on the screen The thesis shde appears.
Joint Vision 3010-with its primacy of information dominance, dominant maneuver and precision weapons-plants the seed of an evolved theory of war that uses complete asymmetric force through "accelerated" cumulative warfare.
By sphencally envelopmg the enemy with sunultaneous strikes throughout the theater of operations, accelerated cumulative warfare maxnruzes the abtitl to be mslde the enemy's ObservatlonOnentauon-Declslon-4cuon cycle (OODA 10op),~ and achieves victory by breakmg kLls mihtary and polmcal wti via total dlsonentatlon. This concept 1s not new Ekldence of the ability to acheve victory through mtiect and cumulative methods may be found m several m&at-y theonsts' wntmgs.
Hou ever, with the advent of advanced mformatlon technologies to mmnmze the fog and fnctlon of war. and preaslon weapons to maxumze the effect of smgle engagements. only now does the ab&ty to rapidly achieve victory with tis method of offense seem cre&ble and achievable. By 2010, we should be able to change how we conduct the most intense joint operations. Instead of relying on massed forces and sequential operations, we will achieve massed effects m other nays. Information superiority and advances in technology will enable us to achieve the desired effects through the tailored application of joint combat power. Higher lethality weapons will allow us to conduct attacks concurrently that formerly required massed assets. (Itahcs mine)"
Jomt Vlslon 2c110 calls for the development of four operational concepts--dommant maneuver, prectilon engagement. full dunennonal protemon, and focused loglstxs-to obtam Full Spectrum Dommance over a future enem) Bnefly, the \ talon defines these operauonal concepts as
. Dominant Maneuver-multidimensional application of capabilities to employ dzspersed forces (air, land, sea and space) to achieve positional advantage and control all dimensions of the battle space; ~ l Precision Enoaoement-the ability to locate, target, employ weapons, and assess 1 damage of an objective or target with a responsh e, real-time command and control system; l Full-dimensional nrotection-provide engaged forces continuous multi-layered defenses to allow for their complete freedom to deploy, maneuver, and engage: / l Focused logistics-responsive and flexible delivery of tailored logistics packages at all levels of operations.
The development of these four concepts ~111 enable U.S forces to dommate all levels of nuhtary operations In the highest mtenslty confhct. the synergy provided by complete battlespace dormnance, maneuver. and preclslon weapons ~111 allow for fewer. dispersed forces to employ overwhelmmg massed effects agamst the enemy Each of the services are explonng operauonal concepts that closely parallel Jomt Vlslon 3OlC's OL erarchmg framework These concepts seek to maxmuze the unique conmbuuons the services can provide to the Jomt battlefield As a result the services are tendmg to polanze toward hvo gross-level offensive functions "Scout-aimers" and *'Shooters".
The Army's "Force XXI" and &gltahzanon of the battlefield nnuauves lean tom ard a hghter, mobtie force with more lethal orgamc weapons. and the abtiq to accurately locate our own forces and target the enemy The &u-me Corps' Sea Dragon laboratory IS mvesugaMg the capabhty to generate rapid, effecuve rads agamst tactical and strategic targets As these mmatlves evol\'e, land forces could develop a * scout-auner" role The "scout-annerr" forces would have the abtity to be mserted and &spersed throughout the battlefield to proklde accurate and real-tune knowledge on enemy forces and strategic posltlons. then rapidly attack targets with orgamc assets or by dlrecung preclslon weapons launched from &stant "shooters."
Under the accelerated cumulauve strategy, these units mould access the overarchmg command, control, and mformanon nets. then act autonomously to estabhsh battle space dommance over their assigned operaang area l7u.s 1s analogous to the way the United States conducted submanne u arfare durmg WWI The submarme's captam was given general dn-ecuons, mtelhgence on the enemy when a\ tiable and assigned a patrol area to smk enemy shlppm, (7 Future land force units would dtier m execunon onl] III then abtity to more rapidly access targetmg mformatlon, t&r flexlbfity m being redirected to other objectives. and their abihty to access a remote Inventory of weapons from the * shooters *'
The ' shooters" -responsn'e, powerful and stealthy-will trace then ongms to the Ar Force s -Global Engagement" and the Na\ y's "Forward. From the Sea" Development of au and sea-based platforms ( e g. B-2, Jomt Stnke Fighter. -4rsenal Ship. S'SSK, and SC-21) with preclslon and submunition stand-off weapons, will provide for engagement of objecm es across the tacucal and strategic spectrum In combmatlon with Army land-based fire support forces. these shooters aould be assigned m a "dn-ect support" role for the engaged scout-auners" dunng cnncal phases of the offense Their weapons 111~ entory would be pre-designated to a particular ground fighung element and be avtiable for nnmedlate access to attack planned targets or targets of opportumty Addlnonallq. rapidly deployed Au Force and Savy forces will provide mmal theater defensive capabtines for own-force full dunenslonal protecnon, and construct the extensive mformatlon, command and control networks reqmred to web dispersed elements of the force together.
Communication and Command: The NAVY way!?
Non-hlerarchcal mformaoon and fusion networks will hnk the "scout-me&'. 'shooters". and commanders These networks will be the daughters of the current commumcation and weapon control mtlanves such as JTIDS, LIKK16, Cooperanve Engagement, and strategic command and control sj stems The future nets orks will be characterized by universal access. automauc fusion capabllrty, and advanced decision algonthms These advances WIU result m a "flattemng" of the command structure and smaller command staffs I1 Communications and coordmatlon between commanders.
Ispersed ground forces. and supportmg weapons arsenals wfl be real-tune Se\ eral problems can anse from a tradmonal centrahzed command strategy with these new capabfitles The first 1s rmcro-management of the engaged units by layers of commanders and pohucal leaders I2 An undesirable tendency for '-group thmk" and "collecuve process" decision makmg occurs when everyone 1s tempted to "have their say-' The outcome 1s group consensus decisions that tend to be nsk adverse l3 .4ddmonally. on-scene m&vldual muatlve IS hscouraged and mgenmty If the nunal offensive does not produce sufficient "Shock and Awe" to result III a qmck vlctoq hke our scenano, the deployed land uruts wti contmue to estabhsh dormnance m then sectors to create a cancerous unpresslon m the enemy's operational area Thus form of accelerated cumulative warfare w I.U be analogous to a rapid guemlla strategy envlsloned by 14ao Tse-Tung I6 U.S land umts WIU operate behmd enemy hnes further LI ldemng their "guemlla zones and bases" until the enemy forces are III isolated pockets of resrxance Our rapid "modem Mao" strategy, however, wfl give the Amencan "guemllas" the supenor loglst~cs, weapons, and command and control capabtiues. Their acaons. m concurrence with the strategic efforts of au, naval, and mformation v+arfa.re assets, R fl create a spatial and temporal envelopment of the enemy A recent opermon demonstratmg the cumulanve effect of dispersed ObJecnves 1s the SAT0 a.~ stnkes agamst the Bosman Serbs. Multiple targets where selected for sunultaneous stnkes to achieve an "overall" demorahzmg effect The Serb "center of gra\ lty" was ldennfied as the wfl to the art of usmg the given means m combat * l9 Ob\lously, the advance of weapon technology has allowed the conduct of war to capltahze on my theones of the unportance of speed m the offense. ' offensive v, a.r reqmres above all a quick, n-reslsuble declslon ""' "In addlnon," Clausewltz conunued. "although the speaker was neghgent not to quot? me at the be-gmnmg of his lecture. I too, described cumulauve warfare. '
Contrastmg ~7th tis extreme view of the connection between successes 111 war, 1s another view, no less extreme, whch holds that uar consists of separate successes each unrelated to the next. as ~II a match conslsung of several games. The earher games ha\e no effect upon the later All that counts 1s the total score, and each separate result makes its contnbutlon toward tlus total " "I wrote &us before either hti Liddell Hart's however. does not dmunlsh the unportance of the ongmal pnnclple Specclfically. this theory ldenufles the center of gravity as the enemy's abtity for a coordmated and sustamed response to our offense. By ensunng we attack ObJecui es to defeat this center--and ohm relatxve supenonty at each objective through a combmauon of tactical surpnse and effecuve. sunultaneous smkes--we may achieve a decslve victory. In this case, the relative supenonty is our ab&ty to engage objectn es faster than our enemy can respond, and our accurate appra& of the ObJecuves to achieve hi demorahzanon * 23 "It won't workl," Jonum spoke, "you two are focusing on only the enemy's hne of commumcatlon What of our own? How do you ldentiy your hnes of commumcatron with forces dispersed behzpeen the enemy's combat elements and his bases 7 You have cut your own hnes through employ ment of your forces! It 1s a self-defeatmg strategy'"
Waqbe I could help here," sad Corbett, "to sat~fy supply of our own forces m a spherical envelopment strategy. we must extend my thesis of the umqueness of mantune lmes of commumcauons to the spheres of the uspace and electro-magnetic dunenaon of the battlefield As I ha\ e explamed, mat-mme commumcauons between enermes generally run parallel, whereas UI land \x arfare they run opposite each other However. ulth the advent of au resupply, and command and control via ra&o waves. only command of the au and the electro-magnetic spectrum need be obtamed to secure vahd suppl> and command routes to these dispersed forces. BeCr_er, If a large portron of these engaged forces are unmanned remote control weapons and scouts. a large resupply effort may not be reqmred *"' "Yes. first command of the au-. sea, and mformatlon conduits must be assured before the commencement of an accelerated cumulate e offense," rephed Clausewltz '-Even tis strategy has elements of sequential warfare, confummg my UnUngS, ' so we wfll never find war m whch the second concept (cumulauve), 1s so prevalent that the first (sequent@ can be disregarded altogether "' Clausewltz conunued, *' Does this. however. reveal a possible weakness to the strategy? It assumes we hake a clear technological advantage over the enemy, so that we may dommate bun m all dunenaons and spectrums of the battlefield It also unphes our alhes WI.U be able to partlclpate m our offense on almost equal technological terms Relanonshlps between ally and enemy have been fled m hstory. An ally may become a future enemy Therefore these assumptions may be m contra&ctlon, and nnply a danger m losmg mformauon dommance ~Tus. m turn, would mean the mabtity to obtm command of this spectrum and the loss of absolute targetmg, locatmg, and attactig enemy forces Jn short, a return to heavy "fog" m the execution of the battle. Second. the letel of mtegrahon of a&es mto the command and conuol web of our future battlefield must be consldered. These decisions must be made durmg mtemauonal trammg exercises pnor to employment of forces for war In turn, thrs could have an effect on the technological a.m~ race as mformauon 1s shared among alhes and possibly obtamed by potential adversanes
Thud. If we are successful m convmcmg potennal adversanes of the futity of conventlonal armed confhct. they may seek altemanve waj s to modify our will through terrorism, nuclear black mai econonnc mformatlon dlsrupuon, and guemlla warfare. Small umts. tramed to operate mdependentlq XI the accelerated cumulauve strategy. are also well prepared to engage man] of these d-u-eats We must. however, COnMUe to develop mtelhgent methods to momtor and explore effective defenses agamst these dangers Fmally. the current U.S nuhtary force structure must evolve as mformanon capabihtles and affordable preclslon aeapons become avtiable As stated earher, the services have \ anous m.mau\es that layout general concepts to exploit these technologies as they are dehvered to the operatmg forces form of command strategy I thmk the larger challenge. however, will be to ldennfy strategic measures to e\ aluate the effectiveness of an accelerated cumulatn e strategy w hllz the offense 1s m progress .' "Truly a conslderauon," mterrupted Sun-Tzu "It 1s tune, however. for us to disperse to the various semmars and msplre the young men and women to explore these ideas There 1s much more for the strategist to ponder"' Jorm~ll turned to Clause\+ ltz and whspered, ' Must he always ha\ e the final word?" "Yes'** came Sun Tzu's reply.
